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I. INTRODUCTION
Executives and marketing professionals view customer retention and customer acquisition as rst-
order objectives across a broad range of industries, such as credit card and insurance, grocery stores
and other retail outlets, and business-to-business markets of intermediate goods. Underlying this
jargon is presumably the sensible idea that customer base is sticky, and is therefore an important
determinant of rmsassets and success. This importance can be driven by various non-exclusive
mechanisms, such as idiosyncratic preferences (Bronnenberg, Dube and Gentzkow [forthcoming]),
costly search (Hall [2008]), or costly switching (Klemperer [1987]).
As pointed out in the seminal contribution of Klemperer [1987], switching costs provide rms
with two o¤setting incentives relative to frictionless markets. On one hand, rms have incentives to
compete more aggressively in order to acquire new customers, who will be subsequently captured.
On the other hand, competition would be softer over customers who are already captured and
therefore less price elastic. Our goal in this paper is to develop a simple framework that would
allow us to investigate the importance of this issue in the context of imperfect competition and
antitrust policy.
Specically, we develop a stylized model of dynamic oligopoly in customer markets. The setting
we propose extends the standard Hotelling model to more than two rms, in a similar way to the
pyramidal model proposed by von Ungern-Sternberg [1991] and the spokes model proposed by Chen
and Riordan [2007]. Unlike other extensions that are common in the literature, the model maintains
certain linearity and symmetry assumptions that produce several attractive properties, which are
maintained in the dynamic framework. In particular, we obtain an equilibrium existence and
uniqueness result, which lead to unambiguous equilibrium predictions and to sharp and intuitive
comparative statics. For instance, in the case of single-product rms the equilibrium prices are
perfectly positively correlated with rms(possibly heterogenous) costs, and perfectly negatively
correlated with the market shares. As a result, each of our various welfare measures can be written
as a linear function of the mean and variance of costs, market shares, or prices. The theoretical
framework we propose is rich enough to capture ideas of market power and imperfect competition,
asymmetric rms, dynamic consumers, product di¤erentiation, and multi-product rms. Yet, we
make many strong assumptions in order to obtain the equilibrium existence and uniqueness results.
We illustrate the possible application of the model in the context of merger analysis in a dynamic
environment. For example, similar to the famous result by Cowling and Waterson [1976] in the
context of static Cournot competition, we show that equilibrium in our model also gives rise to
average markups that are proportional to the Hirschman Herndahl Index (HHI). We also use the
model to analyze the price and welfare e¤ects of mergers, and to assess how important dynamic
considerations may be relative to static measures of concentration.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the general setting and its
relationship to the existing literature in more detail. Section III analyzes equilibrium in a static
context, which is a special case of our subsequent dynamic analysis. Section IV describes the way
we introduce dynamics, and Section V denes the equilibrium concept we use and establishes (in
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Theorem 1) our main uniqueness results. Sections VI describes the comparative statics properties
of the model, and Section VII illustrates how one can use the model by using it to analyze the e¤ect
of mergers. The last section concludes. We relegate all proofs and many other technical details to
the appendix.
II. GENERAL SETTING AND RELATED LITERATURE
Setting. We consider a spatial setting with J  2 horizontally di¤erentiated products. The special
case of J = 2 of our setting reduces to the familiar linear city (of length L), where consumers are
spread along the city and both products located at the edges. However, while authors often use
circular city models (with equidistant products) to extend spatial models to cases with more than
two products, we propose a di¤erent extension. Our setting with J products considers consumers
that are spread along the J(J   1)=2 segments of the (J   1) simplex, with the products located
at the vertices. Thus, with J = 3 consumers are located along the three edges of an equilateral
triangle, with J = 4 along the six segments of a regular tetrahedron, and so on. While we allow
products to be associated with di¤erent costs of production (see later), we assume that products
are identical from the consumersperspective, so net of transport cost all consumers value all
products the same and take their locations as given.
Because our main focus is on investigating dynamic price competition, this type of setting has
certain attractive features. Most importantly, while circular city models describe a symmetric
product space, a given product is always closer to some products and further away from others,
leading to high-dimensional o¤-equilibrium-path strategies. In contrast, our setting makes all com-
peting products equally distant from a given product, leading to (o¤-equilibrium-path) equilibrium
strategies that depend on a single su¢ cient statistic, dramatically simplifying the analysis.
This global competitionfeature of the model (as opposed to the local competitionfeature of
a circular city model, a distinction emphasized by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1992]) makes our
setting similar to symmetric logit and CES (constant elasticity of substitution) demand models. Our
particular formulation, however, gives rise to attractive algebraic features of competition that allow
the state variables to enter linearly, facilitating closed-form solutions which would not have been
possible with alternative (and perhaps more familiar) models. This attractive algebraic feature is
driven by the assumption that the market is fully covered, which we employ throughout the analysis.
We also assume throughout that consumers face linear transport cost, which are normalized to one
per unit distance.
Throughout the analysis we make the strong simplifying assumption that consumers on a given
segment only consider the two products located at the end of the segment.1 We assume that
1This assumpion is primarily made to simplify the analysis. It can be motivated by narrow awareness or consider-
ation sets, or by su¢ ciently convex transport costs. In the symmetric static version of the model, it is easy to verify
that the assumption is not binding in equilibrium. Yet, in the dynamic context there are several potential ways by
which one could relax the assumption, so investigating the sensitivity of the results to this assumption in the dynamic
context is more open-ended.
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consumers are uniformly distributed across segments and along each segment, with density fJ .
Provided that the density is constant across segments, it will not play an important role in the
subsequent analysis; moreover, letting it be a function of J allows it to capture potential market
expansion e¤ects resulting from additional (di¤erentiated) products in the market. It is natural
to think of fJ as decreasing in J . Depending on the extent of business stealing associated with
additional products, the ratio fJ=fJ+1 will be between one (no business stealing) and (J+1)=(J 1)
(no market expansion). Finally, it will be convenient to deneM as the market size, or the number
of consumers in the market. With the above assumptions, it is easy to see that M = J(J 1)2 LfJ .
Relationship to the literature. From a modeling perspective, our static framework described
above is very similar to the one proposed by von Ungern-Sternberg [1991], whose initial description
of the model begins as a collection of stochastic Salop circles, but then transitions to describe the
product space as a pyramidalstructure, similar to ours. The focus of his paper is on presenting the
setting in a static context, suggesting its usefulness in the context of international trade applications.
The setting above is also isomorphic to the spokes model proposed by Chen and Riordan [2007].
They also extend the Hotelling model, but have a di¤erent motivation; they only focus on a static
analysis, as in von Ungern-Sternberg [1991]. In fact, Chen and Riordans [2007] spokes model nests
the symmetric static version of our model as a special case.
Our primary contribution is the extension and application of this type of setting to study cus-
tomer markets and dynamic price competition. As we describe below, the dynamic extension
builds heavily on Doganoglu [2010], who extends a standard Hotelling duopoly setting in a similar
fashion to ours. One of our key insights is that the combination of the (static) multi-rm setting
proposed by von Ungern-Sternberg [1991] and Chen and Riordan [2007] with the dynamic extension
proposed by Doganoglu [2010] is quite attractive from a theoretical standpoint, and it allows us to
derive sharp equilibrium results for oligopolistic dynamic price competition. The subsequent exten-
sion of the analysis to multi-product rms and cost asymmetries present additional contributions
of our paper.
From an economic perspective, our work contributes to the theoretical literature that analyze
pricing incentives in markets with switching costs (von Weizsacker [1984], Beggs and Klemperer
[1992], Cabral, [2008], Doganoglu [2010], and Dube, Hitsch and Rossi [2010]). Our approach and
emphasis are di¤erent, however. Much of the existing literature is focused on the analysis of
duopolistic competition, and on the question of whether switching costs lead to higher or lower
prices. In contrast, we focus on developing a stylized framework that can be applied for markets
with more than two, potentially asymmetric rms. Our work is also related to the inuential work of
Farrell and Shapiro [1990], who analyze the price and welfare e¤ects of mergers in Cournot oligopoly.
Unlike them, our framework allows for product di¤erentiation (leading the merged entity to obtain
some competitive edge after the merger) and asymmetric rms, thus allowing the exploration of a
rich and heterogeneous set of possible mergers.
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III. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE STATIC CASE
While our focus is on dynamic consumers and dynamic price competition, we start by illustrating
the static case. This may be useful to build intuition and also as a benchmark for our subsequent
analysis.
Demand. Given the above setting, demand for product i on each segment i$ j is given by
Di$j(pi; pj) =
1
2
(L  pi + pj) fJ ; (1)
where L is the length of the segment, fJ is the (uniform) density of consumers along the segment,
and pi is the price of product i.2 Total demand (across all segments) for product i, as a function
of its price and the prices of the other products p i, is then given by
Di(pi; p i) =
X
j 6=iDi$j(pi; pj) =
X
j 6=i
1
2
(L  pi + pj) fJ = J   1
2
(L  pi + p i) fJ ; (2)
already illustrating how the features of the model make the average price of competing products,
p i, su¢ cient to summarize residual demand faced by product i.3
Equilibrium with single-product rms. Consider rst the case of single-product rms; we analyze
a case with multi-product rms later in the paper. We assume that the per-unit cost of producing
product i (by rm i) is given by ci, so rm i sets its price to solve
max
pi
(pi   ci)Di(pi; p i) = (pi   ci) J   1
2
(L  pi + p i) fJ : (3)
The rst order condition is given by L  2pi+ p i+ ci = 0, resulting in a best response function of
pi =
1
2
(L+ ci + p i) : (4)
As long as costs are not too heterogeneous, in equilibrium all rms have an internal solution, so
that equilibrium prices are given by
pi = c+
(J   1)
2J   1 (ci   c) + L: (5)
In a symmetric case (ci = c for all i), this expression simplies to p = c + L. That is, the
static equilibrium markup only depends on the length of the segment, or on how di¤erentiated the
products are. In the more general case of equation (5), we can still decompose the equilibrium price
to two components, with the rst driven only by production costs and the second only by product
di¤erentiation. This property will extend to the dynamic model, allowing for simple comparative
statics.
2We note that the expression for demand derived above is only valid when 1
2
(L  pi + pj) is in [0; L] for all i and
j. We later verify that this condition indeed holds in equilibrium.
3Carlson and McAfee [1982] present a model that shares this feature; in their model consumers have heterogenous
search costs. The model developed by Vogel [2008] also has a similar equilibrium feature; in his case, this is due to
endogenous location choice by rms.
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Since prices are strategic complements, equilibrium prices are monotone in production costs.
That is, if one rms costs increase it will raise its own price, leading to further price increases by
its competitors; hence, all equilibrium prices will increase. Moreover, the derivative of price with
respect to cost is less than one, making equilibrium price dispersion lower than the heterogeneity
in costs. These two standard properties of price competition will also extend to the more general
dynamic model.
It is instructive to link this model to the Hirschman-Herndahl Index, HHI =
P
i x
2
i where xi
is rm is market share. Using equation (5), equilibrium markups are given by pi ci = J(c ci)2J 1 +L.
Substituting for the equilibrium prices, one can also derive the market share of rm i to be xi =
1
JL

L+ J(c ci)2J 1

. Taken together, notice that pi   ci = xiJL and that
X
i
(pi   ci)xi = JL
X
i
x2i = JL HHI: (6)
Thus, conditional on the number of products, the average markup is proportional to the Herndahl
Index, a similar result to the one derived by Cowling and Waterson [1976] in the context of a
Cournot model.4 In equilibrium, more e¢ cient rms will be able to maintain larger markups
and market shares. As a result, both the HHI index and the average markup increase with cost
dispersion. We will derive a similar expression for the dynamic model we present below.
IV. INTRODUCING DYNAMICS
We now extend the model to allow for dynamics. We introduce consumer dynamics by borrowing
heavily from the work of Doganoglu [2010], who makes similar modeling assumptions in order to
develop a model of duopolistic competition with consumer switching in equilibrium. Like Doganoglu
[2010], we assume that consumers live for two periods with overlapping generations. Each period of
the model a new generation of consumers arrive at the market, so overall demand in a given period
is driven by a generation of youngconsumers who are buying for the rst time, and a generation
of old consumers who are buying for the second time and are already a¢ liated with a certain
product. We assume a constant population growth rate g, so that if fJ represents the (uniform)
density of old consumers, gfJ will represent the density of young consumers. We note that g could
be either greater or less than one.
Consumers who purchase one product in the rst period and a di¤erent product in the second
period have to incur switching costs, which are denoted by s. We also assume that consumers
locations remain on the same segment in both periods, but their specic location within the seg-
ment is redrawn in the second period independently of where the consumers where located earlier.
While this assumption is not as natural (although perhaps can be motivated by a taste shock or
a learning story), it is not as crucial either. It essentially introduces smoothness into the residual
demand function and is somewhat analogous to any other formulation of noise injected to individual
4 In a Cournot model with homogeneous products and linear demand P = A   BQ the average markup is equal
to: J(A c)
(J+1)
HHI.
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demands (from the rmsperspective). This smoothness naturally simplies the analysis, avoiding
discontinuities in the marginal prot function and possible related problems of non-existence of
pure-strategy equilibrium.
Following these assumptions, old consumers (those in the second period of their lives) are
drawn uniformly over the various segments of the market, but because of the switching costs these
consumers are split to those who purchased previously one product (and therefore have an increased
incentive to purchase it again) and those who purchased the other product. Static incentives of
young consumers (those in the rst period of their lives) are as in the static version of the model,
but their value function includes the discounted utility they obtain in the subsequent period. We
make the natural assumption that consumers know the game rms play and can therefore perfectly
predict rmsfuture pricing behavior.
Demand. Given the assumptions above, demand for product i is generated from three sources:
existing (old) consumers of product i, existing (old) consumers of competing products, and new
(young) consumers. Deriving demands from old consumers is analogous to the static model, except
that it also includes the switching cost s. Thus, demand on segment i $ j from existing (old)
consumers of product i and existing (old) consumers of product j is given, respectively, by
Dold;ii$j (pi; pj) =
1
2
(L  pi + pj + s) fJ (7)
Dold;ji$j (pi; pj) =
1
2
(L  pi + pj   s) fJ : (8)
Let xi$j denote product is market share among old consumers on segment i $ j, so aggregate
demand for product i from old consumers is given by
Doldi (pi; p i; xi) =
X
j 6=i
h
xi$jD
old;i
i$j (pi; pj) + (1  xi$j)Dold;ji$j (pi; pj)
i
(9)
=
X
j 6=i

xi$j
1
2
(L  pi + pj + s) fJ + (1  xi$j)1
2
(L  pi + pj   s) fJ

=
J   1
2
(L  pi + p i) fJ + J   1
2
(2xi   1) sfJ ;
where xi is the average share of product i across the di¤erent segments. Because product is overall
market share is, mechanically, xi =
(J 1)xi
(J 1)J=2 =
2xi
J , we can express demand from old consumers in
terms of xi, so that
Doldi (pi; p i; xi) =
(J   1) fJ
2
[(L  pi + p i) + (Jxi   1) s] : (10)
An important observation is that the demand from old consumers depends only on p i, pi, and xi.
Moreover, it is linear in these three variables.5
Demand from new consumers in segment i$ j is more subtle, as consumers are forward looking
and account for the equilibrium e¤ect of current prices on future prices. In Appendix A we show
5We note that, as in the static case (see footnote 2), the expressions for demand derived above are only valid when
the prices are close enough so that there is an interior solution. We later verify that this condition indeed holds in
equilibrium.
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the derivation, which leads to
Dyoungi$j (pi; pj) =
1
2

L  pi + pj   c s
L
 
p0i()  p0j()

gfJ ; (11)
which aggregates over segments to
Dyoungi (pi; p i) =
J   1
2
(L  pi + p i) gfJ   1
2
c
s
L

(J   1)p0i() 
X
j 6=i p
0
j()

gfJ : (12)
Here, c is the rate at which consumers discount second period utility and p0i() and p0j() are the
equilibrium prices consumers (correctly) expect to face in the subsequent period. We intentionally
do not specify the variables that enter these pricing functions as we later specify these explicitly as
part of our equilibrium denition.
Notice that s, pi, and ci are all expressed in monetary units. The transportation cost, which
captures the degree of product di¤erentiation in the model, is also expressed in those terms; the
transportation cost from one vertex to another vertex along the connecting segment is L monetary
units. To economize on notation, we normalize by setting L = 1; therefore, switching costs s, prices
pi, and production costs ci should all be interpreted relative to L.
Market shares and welfare under stationary prices. Suppose that consumers anticipate that
rms will set prices equal to p = fpigJi=1 in every future period, as would be the case in a stationary
equilibrium. From equation (12) we know the market share of rm i among young consumers would
then be
xi =
1
J
  (1 + cs) pi   p
J   1 . (13)
Price dispersion will be translated into shares dispersion according to the long-run price sensitivity
of young consumers demand, denoted by X  (1 + cs). From equation (10), we know that rm i
will sell to a fraction mi of the market in each period, where
mi =
gxi +D
old
i (pi; p i; xi)M
 1
1 + g
=
1
J
  1 + (1 + cs) (g + s)
1 + g
(pi   p)
(J   1) . (14)
We denote by M  1+(1+cs)(g+s)1+g the long-run price sensitivity of total demand.6
Equations (13) and (14) describe the steady state allocation associated with each stationary
price vector. We show that these linear relationships between prices and market shares imply that
steady state welfare analysis requires only to know three equilibrium outcomes: the mean and the
variance of the vector of steady state prices and the covariance between prices and costs, that is:
(i) p = J 1
P
pi; (ii) 2p = (J   1) 1
P
(pi   p)2; and (iii) cp = (J   1) 1
P
(pi   p) (ci   c).
Welfare analysis in an overlapping generation model with population growth where agents have
di¤erent discount factors involves non-trivial inter-personal and intertemporal comparisons. We
6Both M and X are increasing in s and c. Patient young consumers are more sensitive to steady state price
di¤erences in markets where switching costs are high. They prefer to become attached to the least expensive products.
Old consumers are even more responsive to stationary prices than young consumers. Old consumers will be more
likely to choose the lowest priced product not only because it is cheaper today but also because it is more likely that
they purchased it and got attached to it in the previous period. As a result, when there is a small proportion of old
consumers (high g) the total market share is less responsive to stationary prices, i.e., M is decreasing in g.
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adopt a rather simple approach. Since the market is fully covered in each period and each consumer
always ends up consuming exactly one product, we focus on the per-period costs associated to
each steady state allocation. Total costs include transportation, switching, and production costs.
Consumer costs include transportation and switching costs, and the purchase price. Firms prots
are revenues minus production costs. We normalize our measures of costs and prots by the number
of consumers in each period: M (1 + g).
The allocation associated with state price vector p implies the following transportation and
switching costs:
TSC (p) =
1 + g + (2  s) s
4 (1 + g)
+
1 + g (1 + cs)
2
2 (1 + g)
2p: (15)
These costs are increasing with switching costs and with the share of old consumers because only
old consumers pay switching costs. Production costs are
PC (p) =
X
mici = c  1 + (1 + cs) (g + s)
(1 + g)
cp: (16)
Production costs are decreasing with the covariance of costs and prices. If high-cost rms set high
prices, their demand will be lower and their production share will fall, leading to higher e¢ ciency
in production. Consider the normalized rmsrevenues,
R (p) =
X
mipi = p  1 + (1 + cs) (g + s)
(1 + g)
2p: (17)
Holding the average price p constant, price dispersion reduces total revenue as high-price rms have
lower demand. Revenues are just transfers from consumers to rms.
Total costs are easily calculated as
TSC (p) + PC (p) = c+
1 + g + (2  s) s
4 (1 + g)
+
1 + g (1 + cs)
2
2 (1 + g)
2p  
1 + (1 + cs) (g + s)
(1 + g)
cp: (18)
For a given vector of marginal costs c and average price p, the vector of prices that minimizes total
costs is such that (pi   p) =  (ci   c), where the optimal pass-through  is 1+g+s+cgs+cs21+g(1+cs)2 >
1
2
(see Appendix B).
Consumer costs are:
TSC (p) +R (p) = p +
1 + g + (2  s) s
4 (1 + g)
  (1 + (1 + cs) (1  cs) g + 2 (1 + cs) s)
2 (1 + g)
2p. (19)
Consumers are worse o¤ when switching costs are high and when g is low because only old con-
sumers pay switching costs. Price dispersion reduces consumerscosts as they substitute to the less
expensive products. As a result, consumers benet from a high pass-through from costs to prices.
Firmsprots are revenues minus production costs:
R (p)  PC (p) = p  c+ 1 + (1 + cs) (g + s)
(1 + g)
 
cp   2p

: (20)
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Firms prots are increasing in the average markup. Higher prots are associated with a high
correlation between production costs and prices and low dispersion of prices. For a given vector of
marginal costs c and average price p, the vector of prices that maximizes rms prots is such that
(pi   p) = 12 (ci   c). In other words, the pass-through that maximizes rmsprots is 12 .
The analysis of consumer costs, rms prots, and total welfare (costs) can be decomposed to the
analysis of the average, dispersion, and covariance of prices and costs:
 
p; c; 2p;cp

. For example,
high average prices p increase rmsprots and consumerscosts. Higher price dispersion, on the
other hand, reduces total welfare, consumer costs and rmsprots. Finally, equation (14) implies
that in a steady state, there is a tight relationship between the HHI and the variance of prices. In
particular,
HHI =
X
m2i =
1
J
+
2M
J   1
2
p. (21)
V. EQUILIBRIUM OF THE DYNAMIC GAME
We model competition as a discrete-time innite-horizon game, where rms maximize their dis-
counted prots. As emphasized in the introduction, the key driver of dynamic incentives arises
from switching costs on the consumer side. In this section we analyze the case of single-product
rms. As before, there are J products, each owned by a di¤erent rm, i.e. N = J . Other than
their locations, consumers treat products symmetrically, but marginal cost ci associated with each
product could vary.
Markov perfect equilibrium. Each period each rm can o¤er a single price to all its consumers
and cannot discriminate between young and old consumers or between its own past customers and
its competitors. We restrict attention to a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which strategies
(prices) can only depend on current market shares among old consumers in each segment. That
is, the relevant state variables can be described by a vector x2 [0; 1]J(J 1)=2 which summarizes
the attachments (market shares) of old consumers to rms, along each segment. That is, xi$j , a
generic element of x, is the share of old consumers along the segment i$ j (with i < j) who have
purchased product i in the previous period. Note that product is overall market share is given by
xi =
2
(J 1)J
P
j 6=i xi$j .
Let Dyoung(p) =
n
Dyoungi$j (pi; pj)
o
j 6=i
denote the vector of demands from young consumers and
Dold(p;x) =
n
Dold;ii$j (pi; pj jxii$j)
o
j 6=i
denote the vector of demand from old consumers. In each
period, rms rst set prices as a function of the state x. Consumers then make their purchasing
decisions according to the demands derived in the previous section, and these choices determine
the state variables for the subsequent period, where one simply needs to normalize by the size of
the cohort of young consumers, which is Mg, so that state variables evolve according to x+1 (x) =
1
MgD
young(p (x)):
In equilibrium, each rm solves the following Bellman equation:
Vi (x) = max
pi

(pi   ci)

Dyoungi (pi; p i) +D
old
i (pi; p i; xi)

+ rfgVi

1
Mg
Dyoung(p (x))

; (22)
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where rf is the rms common actual discount factor (which may or may not be the same as
consumers). Notice that because of the population growth rate, the e¤ective discount factor is
equal to f = rfg. For the rest of the paper we will refer to f as the rms discount factor and
derive comparative statics with respect to it.
Before characterizing the equilibrium properties, it may be useful to develop an intuition re-
garding the role of switching costs and dynamics in the model. First, notice that if there are no
switching cost (s = 0) the model reduces to the static case analyzed earlier since there are no
payo¤ relevant intertemporal linkages. The existence of switching costs creates the incentive to
extract rents from existing customers: rms with large market shares will nd it optimal to charge
higher prices. This is the milkingincentive. On the other hand, forward looking rms also value
greater customer base, which would provide an incentive to acquire new customers via lower prices.
The larger the discount factor f , the stronger the incentive to invest in customer acquisition and
reduce prices. This is the investmentincentive. On the demand side, forward looking consumers
anticipate rmsincentive to milk their existing customers. Therefore, consumers exhibit a weaker
response to (o¤-equilibrium) price changes. This anticipation e¤ect is larger when the discount
factor c is large and when the milking incentive is strong. Finally, for a constant f , the market
growth rate g governs the composition e¤ect between young, less responsive consumers and old
consumers. These are the main incentives and e¤ects that come into play in the model. Notice
that all of these e¤ects depend on the existence of some incentives to milk, i.e. positive switching
costs s > 0.
Indeed, it will be convenient to partition the parameters of the model into two groups. The rst
includes parameters that would a¤ect the static equilibrium (number of products and ownership
structure). The remaining parameters (discount factors, switching cost s, and growth rate g) only
matter when switching costs are positive. These will be referred to as the dynamic parameters of
the model.
Equilibrium denition and renement. Within the class of Markov-strategies, we search for an
equilibrium in which strategies have a simple structure by applying a similar equilibrium concept
to the one used in Beggs and Klemperer [1992]. Specically, we restrict attention to rmspricing
strategies which are linear in the rmsown market share. As we will see, the setting we propose
implies that such an equilibrium exists (and is, in fact, unique). That is, when competing rms
have such linear pricing strategies, the optimal strategy by each rm is also linear in its own market
share. The following denitions will allow us to state formally the permissible strategies we consider
in our search for an equilibrium.
Denition 1 A Markov strategy is a function from states to actions, pi (x). A linear Markov
strategy is a Markov strategy such that pi (x) = 0ix for some vector i. A simple linear Markov
strategy is a linear Markov strategy such that pi (x) = i + ixi.
Restricting the set of permissible strategies allows us to rene the set of equilibria, and makes
the analysis tractable, as it constrains us to work within a linear-quadratic framework. The fol-
lowing denition is a restatement of the Markov perfect equilibrium denition that introduces the
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renements that we will use in the paper.
Denition 2 An MPE in simple linear Markov strategies is a prole of simple linear Markov
strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
Denition 3 An MPE in parallel strategies is a J+1-tuple (1; :::; J ; ) such that the prole of
simple linear strategies fpi (x) = i + xigJi=1 is an MPE.
This concept of MPE in parallel strategies is the one we will use as a solution concept for the
dynamic game. To be clear, this equilibrium solution is a renement not a modication of the
Markov Perfect Equilibria solution concept.
Once rms believe that opponents have linear strategies and that young consumersbeliefs about
future prices conform with these strategies, rmsoptimal behavior would be, indeed, linear in their
market share. We show that there is an equilibrium in which rms play linear strategies that are
parallel. That is, all rmsequilibrium strategies have the same slope coe¢ cient  with respect
to their own share, but have di¤erent intercepts is. Moreover, we show that this equilibrium is
unique within this class and derive the equilibrium strategies explicitly.
Equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Each figJi=1 and  are unknown constants for which we
will solve. Let x0j be consumersbeliefs about rm js market share among young consumers (who
would become old in the subsequent period). Substituting p0j() = j+x0j (for all j) into equation
(12) implies
Dyoungi (pi; p i) =

J   1
2
(1  pi + p i)  cs
2

(J   1)  i    i + x0i  Xj 6=i x0j

gfJ ;
(23)
where  i = 1J 1
P
j 6=i j . Since
P
j 6=i x
0
j = 1  x0i, we obtain
Dyoungi (pi; p i) =
J   1
2
(1  pi + p i) gfJ   cs
2
 
(J   1) (i    i) + Jx0i   

gfJ : (24)
Moreover, correct beliefs also imply that
x0i =
1
Mg
Dyoungi (pi; p i); (25)
which together (see Appendix C) imply
Dyoungi (pi; p i) =Mg

1
J
+
(J   1) ((p i   pi)  cs (i    i))
J ((J   1) + cs)

: (26)
The key observation is that the linearity of demand in rm is own price and its opponents(average)
price is maintained.7
Given this demand from young consumers and demand from old consumers, in equilibrium each
rm solves the following Bellman equation:
V (xi; x i) = max
pi
"
(pi   ci)
 
Dyoungi (pi; p i) +D
old
i (pi; p i; xi)

+
:::+ fV

1
MgD
young
i (pi; p i);
1
MgD
young
 i (pi; p i)
 # ; (27)
7Again, as with old consumers (see footnote 2), here too we note that the expression for demand derived above is
only valid under certain restrictions that we later verify to hold in equilibrium.
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taking as given opponents strategies. However, if pj = j + xj for each rm j then p i =
 i + x i =  i +  1 xiJ 1 , which only depends (linearly!) on xi. We can then simplify rm is
problem to only depend on a single state variable xi:
Vi (xi) = max
pi
0@ (pi   ci)Dyoungi pi;  i +  1 xiJ 1 +Doldi pi;  i +  1 xiJ 1 ; xi+
:::+ fVi

1
MgD
young
i

pi;  i +  1 xiJ 1
 1A : (28)
Since demand is linear in pi and xi (through the linearity in p i), the problem has an attractive
linear-quadratic structure. As is familiar with such problems, we can then continue by guessing
that the value function is quadratic in the state variable,
Vi (xi) = Ai +Bixi + Cix
2
i . (29)
We can then solve for the optimal pricing strategy and obtain new expressions for i and ,
substitute these expression back in equation (28) and nd the new expressions for Ai, Bi, and Ci.
We rst note that the coe¢ cient Ci does not depend on any marginal cost c or price intercept .
Similarly, the resulting slope  does not depend on any of these rm-specic variables either. Both
coe¢ cients depend only on the guessed C and  and on parameters of the model (g; s; c; f ; J).
Therefore, in an MPE in parallel strategies the pair (;C) has to be the same for each and every
rm. We nd a xed point (;C) by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. In Appendix D
we show that nding a xed point is equivalent to nding the roots of a quartic equation in 
with coe¢ cients that depend on the parameters of the model. We show that there is only one
root that gives rise to an interior and stationary equilibrium path, i.e. that lies in the intervalh
  J 11+cs ; J 11 cs
i
.8 We also show that provided that other rms play non-divergent strategies the
prot maximization problem is always concave. Since the roots of a quartic polynomial have closed
form solutions, both  and C have closed form solutions. Once we found (;C) we can calculate
fi; BigJi=1 by solving a 2J-by-2J system of linear equations. Subsequently, we obtain the value
function intercept, Ai, for each rm. The following theorem formalizes this result:
Theorem 1 In the model with s < L = 1, c < 1, f < 1, g > 0; and J  2 there exists an MPE
in parallel strategies. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique within the class of MPEs in parallel
strategies, and it has a closed form solution. In this equilibrium, the common slope  is positive
such that  2
h
0; J 11 cs

, the value function is convex (C > 0) and i = c+ 0 + 1 (ci   c), where
0 > 0 and 1 2 (0; 1).
The proof is in Appendix D. Notice that if all rmscosts were to increase by the same magni-
tude, equilibrium prices will also rise by the same magnitude. However, asymmetric cost variation
will not translate completely into price variation. In equilibrium, an increase in rm is unit cost
is only partially compensated by a price increase.
8The other three roots are associated with strategies that give rise to divergent dynamics of market shares. If
rms expect the vector of market shares to lie on the boundary of the J   1th dimensional simplex they will not play
linear strategies. Therefore, any MPE in linear strategies should have non-divergent dynamics.
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Let us try to provide some intuition. Equilibrium outcomes (; 0; 1) depend only on the
dynamic parameters and not on the distribution of costs.9 If switching costs s are positive, the
location of the residual demand curve of rm i by old consumers will depend positively on its market
share. If g is low, the old consumers represent a large fraction of total population, thus market
shares are a more important determinant of the position of the residual demand curve. These two
parameters are the key determinants of , the slope of the equilibrium pricing strategy with respect
to own market share. High s and low g lead to high .
Consumers will realize that a rm that undercuts its prices today will increase its market share in
the next period, when it will price higher. If they are patient (high c), they will be less responsive
to price changes. As a result, the slope of rms residual demand curve by young consumers is
steeper when c is high.
Except for the traditional tradeo¤ between price and quantity, rms face a trade-o¤ between
pricing low to invest in more locked-in customers that are valuable in the future and pricing high to
extract rents from their current attached customers. If rms are patient the investment motive is
stronger and they price low (high f leads to low 0). If consumers are patient, on the other hand,
the slope of rmsresidual demand curve will be steeper, and prices will be higher (high c leads to
high 0). A large g implies that the share of young consumers with steeper residual demand curves
is larger and prices are higher (high g leads to high 0). A rm with no locked consumers (xi = 0)
would face a lower residual demand curve when switching costs are high, thus high switching costs
are associated with lower policy intercept 0.
The pass-through from costs to prices depends on the slope of the residual demand and marginal
revenue curves. A atter (linear) residual demand curve results in higher pass-through. Therefore,
the policy function will be more sensitive to cost di¤erentials when c and g are low (low c and g
leads to high 1).
Equilibrium prices and welfare. We now discuss the implications of the equilibrium and in
particular the steady state that it gives rise to  for the two primary objects of interest, prices
and welfare. As we emphasize throughout, a common theme is that the framework we propose
has a simple linear-quadratic structure that makes it easy to describe many equilibrium objects
of interest as functions of a small number of summary statistics of the environment: the average,
variance and covariance of prices and costs.
By Theorem 1, equilibrium prices are given by
pi(xi) = 0 + 1 (ci   c) + c+ xi: (30)
That is, the equilibrium price (and markup) of each rm is a linear combination of its own cost
ci, its own state variable (market share among young consumers) xi, and the average cost in the
industry c. The average price across rms is:
p = c+ 0 +

J
. (31)
9For example, equation (5) shows that if s = 0 then  = 0, 0 = L = 1 and 1 =
(J 1)
2J 1
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To derive the steady state, we can substitute pi(xi) into the demand from young consumers
(equation (26)) and solve for a xed point, such that (Mg) 1Dyoungi (pi(xi); p i(x i)) = xi for
every i.
Corollary 2 Each MPE in parallel strategies has a steady state where
xi =
1
J
   (1 + cs)
J   1 +  (1 + cs)1 (ci   c) , and (32)
pi = p+
J   1
J   1 +  (1 + cs)1 (ci   c) . (33)
The steady state pass-through is e = J 1J 1+(1+cs)1. Notice that in the steady state equilib-
rium:
2p = (
e)2 2c and cp = 
e2c . (34)
The welfare measures in equations (18), (19), and (20) all depend on p, pass-through e, and the
distribution of costs. The next section analyzes how p and e depend on the dynamic parameters
and their e¤ect on welfare.
Finally, rmsequilibrium prots can be written as a function of the HHI. Using the results
above, it follows that X
i
(pi   ci)mi = J   1
M
(1  e)
e
HHI. (35)
This expression is similar to the one obtained for the static case in equation (6); the average
equilibrium markup is proportional to the Herndahl Index.
VI. COMPARATIVE STATICS
We illustrate the comparative statics of the model, and in particular how prices and consumer
welfare change with the dynamic parameters. We will rst focus on the baseline case of symmetric
rms with marginal costs normalized to zero. The steady state average price becomes 0 +

J and
consumer costs are 0+

J +
1+g+(2 s)s
4(1+g) . Next, we analyze separately the e¤ect of cost asymmetries.
Figure 1 illustrates the model predictions as to the way that the price and consumer welfare
respond to these primitives. We arbitrarily x the values of the parameters and let them vary one
by one. We plot the equilibrium price (solid line, values on the left y-axis) and consumer costs
(dashed line, values on the right y-axis). We do so assuming parameter values of g = 1, J = N = 5,
c = 0:7, f = 0:5, and s = 0:4 and solving for the (stationary) equilibrium levels of prices and
welfare. Recall that throughout the analysis we normalize the extent of product di¤erentiation, so
that L = 1. The results below are qualitatively similar for di¤erent parameter values.
Panel (a) presents prices and consumer costs as a function of the number of rms, N . As long as
the degree of di¤erentiation remains constant, the number of rms has a modest impact on prices
and welfare, with the overall patterns replicating standard comparative static results from static
models. As mentioned earlier, this is a model in which the product space expands with additional
14
rms, implying that rms have market power even as N goes to innity, so equilibrium prices
converge to a constant which is greater than marginal costs.
Panel (b) graphs prices and consumer costs as a function of market growth rate, showing that
faster growing markets are predicted to generate higher prices (and lower consumer costs).10 A
large g means that there are more young consumers than old ones. The marginal young consumer
accounts for the fact that lower prices today would provide incentives for higher prices tomorrow
and is therefore less price responsive compared to the marginal old consumer (for whom there is
no future). Thus, the overall demand is less elastic which leads to less competition in equilibrium.
However, as g goes to innity, the composition e¤ect disappears since young consumers now antic-
ipate that rms that are going to have larger market share in the future are not going to charge
higher prices. Therefore, they are as responsive as old consumers. Young consumers never incur
switching costs and, as a consequence, consumer costs decline with g despite the fact that average
prices increase with g.
In panel (c) we observe that higher discount factor of consumers is associated with higher
prices and consumer costs. Patient young consumers will be less price elastic since they anticipate
that lower prices today will lead to larger market share and higher prices tomorrow. As a result,
competition is softer. The reverse occurs when rms are patient. In such a case, rms will compete
ercely to gain a larger market share in the future which results in lower prices in steady state.
The intuition is conrmed by panel (d).
Finally, in panel (e) we show that at s = 0 the static results hold and p = 1. For small values
of s the e¤ect described by Doganoglu [2010] holds: prices are lower than the static benchmark.
However, prices are increasing with s for moderate or large values of s. There are two counteracting
e¤ects that arise due to changes in s: the investment incentive and the anticipation e¤ect. By the
investment incentive, higher s provides incentives to reduce prices and capture a larger market
share for the next period. This incentive is stronger if f is high. By the anticipation e¤ect, an
increase in s makes young consumers less responsive to current prices and the equilibrium price is
higher. The anticipation e¤ect is stronger when both s and c are high. For low values of s, the
investment motive prevails (if f > 0) and prices are decreasing in s. As we consider higher values
of s, the anticipation e¤ect becomes stronger and prices will eventually increase with s. This will
happen for lower values of s if f is low and c is high.
A di¤erent way to describe the predictions of the model regarding the two key outcomes of
interest (prices and welfare, measured by consumer costs) is to report partial correlations between
the primitives of the model and the outcomes of interest. To do so, we generate a grid of the
primitives, calculate the equilibrium price for each point on the grid, and then report regression
results in which the dependent variables are prices and consumer welfare, and the regressors are
various transformations of the model primitives. The results are reported in Table I. One could
view these regression results as a possibly useful index. It seems natural to assume that we can
observe (or know) the number of rms, the growth rate g, and the discount factors. Moreover, if we
10Notice that we are increasing g, while holding constant f = rfg.
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observe churn rate h, we could recover the switching costs. To see this, notice that in equilibrium
the churn rate is h = 1 s=L2 .
11 Therefore, under the normalization (L = 1) we obtain s = 1   2h,
and we could simply redene switching costs in terms of churn rates. Thus, if these are known,
one could in principal calculate equilibrium prices (and welfare) using our model or the polynomial
approximation.
To sum up, according to our comparative analysis, competitive environments in our baseline
model are characterized by a large number of rms, impatient consumers, patient rms, low share of
young consumers, and large switching costs. In contrast, less competitive environments are charac-
terized by a small number of rms, patient consumers, impatient rms, a moderately large share of
young consumers, and large switching costs. Notice that large switching costs are compatible with
both extreme cases of competition, but may interact in important ways with other model primitives.
The comparative statics of market growth rate holding constant the rf are ambiguous because the
composition e¤ect is typically anti-competitive, while the investment e¤ect is pro-competitive.
Finally, Corollary 2 and expressions (17) and (19) imply that prices and consumer costs are
linearly increasing in the average cost, c and linearly decreasing in the product of the squared
pass-through rate times the variance of cost, (e)2 2c . In appendix B we show that when s > 0 the
equilibrium pass-through e is less than 12 and that both rms and consumers would be better o¤
if it were larger. For high switching costs environments, a higher pass-through occurs when rms
are patient, consumers are impatient and the share of young consumers in the market is large. In
sum, the dynamic model exhibits a lower pass-through than the static model, which hurts both
consumers and rms. The next section analyzes the e¤ects of mergers on consumer and overall
welfare and shows that a merger between two rms may increase the pass-through.
VII. ILLUSTRATIVEAPPLICATION: THE EFFECTOFAMERGER
Although algebraically cumbersome, the linear-quadratic structure is tractable to allow us to extend
the dynamic model in various directions, and in Appendix E we provide more details. Many such
extensions are possible, and we verify for some of them (in Appendix E) that they lead to a similar
analysis, although extending Theorem 1 to prove existence and, in particular, uniqueness in these
richer settings becomes much more di¢ cult. As one of our primary motivations to developing this
model is related to antitrust policy, we highlight in this section an extension of the model that will
allow us to address mergers.
Our framework also allows us to introduce mergers or multi-product rms in a relatively elegant
way. As before, we x the product space to include J products with identical values (to the
consumers; the products are still associated with di¤erent production costs). A multi-product
rm owns more than a single product. We further assume that a multi-product rm sets a single
11 In any given segment, from all the consumers that bought from rm j in the previous period, only a proportion
L+pj pi+s
2L

will buy again from j. In equilibrium pj = pi so the proportion becomes (1 + s=L) =2. Therefore,
the churn rate is h = (1  s=L) =2. In the general case with asymmetric costs the churn rate also depends on the
consumers discount factor and on the variance of prices: h = 1 s=L
2
  (1 + cs=L) 
2
P
L2
m:
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price that applies to all its products. While the primary reason for this assumption is analytical
convenience, we should also note that the assumption can also be motivated by various realistic
pricing restrictions. For example, clothing stores of the same chain often do not set di¤erent prices
(for the same item) at di¤erent stores in order to preserve the chain reputation and to avoid logistical
complications that would arise with returned merchandise. Grocery chains face a similar constraint,
mostly because they distribute identical yers that advertise in-store prices without knowing which
specic store the customer would visit. A rm that owns more than a single product can extract
monopoly rents from those consumers who are located along the segment whose edges are owned by
the rm. However, as the rm sets a single price and cannot price discriminate across consumers,
it will trade o¤ the incentive to increase price and extract monopolistic rents from segments it
fully controls and the incentive to decrease prices and be more competitive on other, competitive
segments. The more products it owns, the higher the former incentive would be, as in any other
pricing model with market power.12
It may be informative to contrast the conceptual analysis of mergers in the static version of the
model with that of Farrell and Shapiro [1990], who analyze the price and welfare e¤ects of mergers
in Cournot oligopoly. A key feature that they emphasize is the output response of competing rms
to the merger. The limitation of a homogeneous product framework as in Cournot is that (absent
cost synergies) equilibrium forces make the merged entity look like any of the other non-merged
rms after the merger, reducing the unilateral incentives to merge (and presumably driving much of
the strong and inuential results derived in Farrell and Shapiro [1990]). While our framework also
delivers this endogenous output response by competing rms, the di¤erentiated products framework
implies that the merged entity remains larger and with greater market power due to its increased
product variety relative to non-merged rms. This greater product coverage seems an important
consideration for many mergers, and will increase the unilateral merger incentives.
Static equilibrium with multi-product rms. Before we move on to analyze the fully dynamic
model, we discuss the e¤ects of a merger in the static case. Consider the case of N = J   1 rms,
where rms 1 through N 1 each own product 1 through J 2, respectively, and rm N owns both
product J   1 and product J . The single-product rms solve the same pricing problem as in the
previous (single-product) case, so their best response functions are given by equation (5) derived
earlier. Firm N would solve
max
pN
[(pN   cJ 1)DJ 1(pJ 1 = pN ; pJ = pN ; p1; :::; pJ 2) + (pN   cJ)DJ(pJ 1 = pN ; pJ = pN ; p1; :::; pJ 2)] :
(36)
Solving for the resulting best response and then for the equilibrium prices (see Appendix F), we
12Recall our assumption that consumers value the good enough so that the market is fully covered. With monopoly
power over some segments, we now need to also assume that consumers do not value the good enough to provide
incentives to the merged entity to forgo all consumers in the competitive segments and sell only to the segment it
controls.
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obtain that the steady-state equilibrium prices are given by
psi =

1 +
1
J (J   2)

+ c+
J   1
2J   1 (ci   cs) +
1
J
(cs   cm) (37)
pmN =

1 +
(J + 1)
2J (J   2)

+ c  (J   3)
2J
(cs   cm) (38)
where psi is the equilibrium price of a single-product rm i = 1; 2; :::; N 1, and pmN is the equilibrium
price of the one multi-product rm N . In these equations, cs is the average cost of all the single-
product rms and cm is the average cost of the multi-product rm.
The merger will change the average prices p, price dispersion 2p, and the covariance between
costs and prices cpthe three su¢ cient statistics to describe the e¤ects on our measures of welfare.
The unweighted average price of all products sold in the steady state equilibrium after the merger
is
pm =

1 +
2J   1
J2 (J   2)

+ c+
1
J2
(cs   cm) . (39)
The pre-merger average price is just: p = 1 + c. The merger has two e¤ects on this average.
First, the merger has a direct anti-competitive e¤ect equal to 2J 1
J2(J 2) . Intuitively, the merged rm
can extract rents from the segment that it fully controls and will have incentives to price higher.
Because prices are strategic complements, it will induce an overall increase in prices. Second, if
the merger is between two low-cost rms prices will be higher. The intuition behind this result
can be illustrated in a simple case with four rms, two high-cost and two low-cost. If the two
low-cost rms merge they will have plenty of room to exercise their market power because they will
only compete against the two high-cost rms. If the two high-cost rm merge they will still face a
very competitive market. Both the direct e¤ect and the e¤ect of the cost di¤erences decrease at a
quadratic rate with J .
The variance of prices after the merger is
2;mp =
(J   1)2
(2J   1)2
2
c+
(J   1)
2 (J   2) J3  
(J   1)
J3
(cs   cm)  (J   2) (4J   1) (J   1)
2J3 (2J   1)2 (cs   cm)
2 : (40)
The pre-merger variance is just: 2p =
(J 1)2
(2J 1)2
2
c . The merger has two e¤ects on this variance.
First, a direct positive e¤ect decreases with J at a cubic rate. Even if all rms have the same cost,
the merger increases the variance of costs because the merged entity will have incentives to price
higher. Second, the variance of prices will fall if the merger is between two low-cost rms. Before
the merger the low-cost rms were charging low prices. After the merger they set higher prices. As
a result, the overall price dispersion falls. This e¤ect decreases at a quadratic rate with J .
The covariance between prices and costs is
mpc =
J   1
(2J   1)
2
c  
1
J2
(cs   cm)  (J   2)
J2 (2J   1) (cs   cm)
2 . (41)
The pre-merger covariance is pc =
(J 1)
(2J 1)
2
c . Notice that if two low-cost rms merge the covariance
falls. This e¤ect decreases at a quadratic rate with J .
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Mergers harm consumers and benet rms. These e¤ects are stronger when two low-cost rms
merge. A merger between two low-cost rms generates a larger price increase, reduces price disper-
sion and shifts production towards less e¢ cient rms reducing total welfare. A merger between two
high-cost rms increases the covariance between prices and costs, shifts production towards more
e¢ cient rms and may increase total welfare.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the e¤ect of mergers on average prices, consumer costs and total
costs for di¤erent values of J and (cs   cm). The results of the static model discussed here are
represented by the x symbols in the gures. Figure 2 shows the e¤ect on average prices for
di¤erent values of J holding cs   cm = 0, e.g., a merger in a market with J = 6 goods increases
average prices by 0.074. The e¤ect of the merger on prices is decreasing in J . Figure 3 shows the
e¤ect on consumersand total costs. A merger in a market with J = 5 goods where cs   cm = 0:5,
i.e., when two low-cost rms merge, increases consumers costs by 0.147 and total costs by 0.017. If
two high-cost rms merge, cs   cm =  0:5, consumerscosts increase only by 0.091 and total costs
drop by 0.007. These e¤ects are decreasing in J:
The dynamic analysis. We now analyze the e¤ects of a merger in a dynamic market with
switching costs and compare them with those in the static case.
The dynamic model with single-product rms benetted from linear residual demand functions
that were completely determined by the average price charged by the competitors. To solve the
dynamic model after a merger, all one needs to observe is that the same linearity properties still
apply, but now a su¢ cient statistic for competition is the type-by-type average of price and market
share. That is, a single rm can partition competing rms to types based on the number of products
they own, and then condition pricing policies on its own market share among rms of its own type,
and on the overall market shares of each type. With K types, this implies K state variables, but
the linear-quadratic structure remains. Appendix E provides more details about this particular
extension and its solution. To illustrate the analysis and the results, we focus again on the specic
case where the initial market structure has N = J single-product rms, while the post-merger
structure has N = J   2 such rms and a single merged entity that owns two products. In such a
case, the pre-merger equilibrium is our baseline model, while the post-merger equilibrium has rms
of two types (the merged rm and everyone else).13
The unweighted average price after the merger is
pm = pmss0 + c+ 
m
0 (cs   cm) , (42)
where pmss0 and 
m
0 depend on the dynamic parameters (s; f ; c and g) and J . The direct e¤ect of
the merger on average prices is the di¤erence between pmss0 and 0 +

J . This di¤erence is positive
for all parameter congurations. Average prices are higher when two low-cost rms merge, i.e.,
m0 > 0.
13We focus the discussion on comparing the steady state of the market prior to the merger with the post-merger
steady state. Our framework also allows us to investigate and analyze the transition from one steady state to the
other. As one may expect given the discrete-nature of consumer cohorts in our model, this transitions follows an
oscillating pricing (and market share) patterns that (relatively quickly) converge to the new steady state.
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The price variance after the merger is
2;mp = (
m)2 2c   m0 (cs   cm) + m1   m2 (cs   cm)2 , (43)
where m; m0 ; 
m
1 ; 
m
2 > 0 depend on the dynamic parameters. 
m, the post-merger pass-through,
is lower than the pre-merger pass-through e and than the static pass-through J 12J 1 . Price disper-
sion will be lower if two low-cost rms merge. The covariance between prices and costs after the
merger is
mpc = 
m2c   m0 (cs   cm)  m2 (cs   cm)2 , (44)
where m0 ; 
m
2 > 0 are functions of the dynamic parameters. This covariance will be higher if the
merger is between two high-cost rms. The e¤ect of the merger on price average, variance, and
covariance with costs works in the same direction as in the static model. The intuition behind the
welfare e¤ects of the merger is also very similar to the static case. The magnitude of these e¤ects,
however, will be reduced or amplied by dynamic considerations.
To quantify the e¤ect of the merger in dynamic environments we rst consider a symmetric
cost environment and calculate the e¤ects on the average price and welfare, and then consider the
e¤ects of cost asymmetries.
We start with the case of symmetric marginal costs, by computing the merger e¤ect for a range
of parameter values that span the entire parameter space. Figure 2 reports the results for the
price e¤ect of such mergers, starting from di¤erent numbers of initial number of (symmetric) rms.
As a way of comparison, recall that when s = 0, in which case the model reduces to the static
model, the price is equal to 1. The results in Figure 2 are presented so that each set of parameter
value is a point, and together these points cover the entire range of possible price e¤ects, for a
given N = J . Clearly, because the equilibrium outcomes are continuous in the primitives, the
implied e¤ects generate compact sets. The key point to notice in Figure 2 is that for relatively
concentrated markets (N < 8), the number of rms (or products) is the most important variable to
determine the merger e¤ect of prices and consumer welfare: for concentrated markets, the ranking
of concentration matches the predicted e¤ect of the merger, with no overlap in the range of the
predicted e¤ect. In other words, the e¤ect of a merger in an industry with N < 8 symmetric rms
is greater than the e¤ect in an industry with N + 1 symmetric rms regardless of the values of the
other market primitives. This in a way can justify the use of a simple Hirschman-Herndahl Index
(HHI) as a quick way to evaluate mergers to the extent that the index reects N = J (the number
of di¤erentiated products in the market).
Once markets become less concentrated, the e¤ect of N becomes smaller and more comparable
to the e¤ect of other economic primitives of the market. This can be seen in Figure 2 by the fair
amount of overlap in the predicted e¤ects of the merger as we move from N = 10 to N = 11 and
to N = 12. This patterns suggests that for markets with intermediate levels of concentration, it
may be insu¢ cient to focus on concentration index, as other market primitives may play an equally
important role.
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It may be also instructive to understand which parameters lead to the greatest and smallest
e¤ects of a merger on prices and consumer welfare. The greatest e¤ects (on both prices and
consumer costs) arise in less competitive environments, i.e., when s ! 1, g moderately large,
c ! 1, and f ! 0. The smallest e¤ects arise in competitive environments, when s ! 1, g ! 0,
c ! 0 and f ! 1. When consumers are myopic and rms care more about the future, merger will
lead to smaller price and welfare e¤ects. When consumers are forward looking and rms care more
about static incentives, the merger e¤ects are greater. Indeed, applying regression analysis to the
simulated e¤ects, we nd that one of the best way to predict the post-merger outcome is to condition
the analysis on pre-merger outcome, which capture in a reduced form way the competitiveness of
the industry.
Panel A of Table II shows the result of regressing the post-merger price pm on the pre-merger
price p for a grid of dynamic parameters. Conditional on N , the per-merger price operates almost
as a su¢ cient statistic for the post-merger price, with all regression having values of R2 that are
essentially one, despite having only two coe¢ cients. The constant coe¢ cient captures the e¤ect
of the merger that is independent of the dynamic parameters. The e¤ect of the merger is larger
when the number of products/rms is low. The coe¢ cient on p shows that higher pre-merger prices
are associated to higher post-merger prices. Moreover, these coe¢ cients are greater than one and
decreasing in N which implies that the e¤ect of the merger, pm   p, is larger when the dynamic
conguration is such that p is high. Panel B of Table II shows a set of similar results for consumer
costs. Intuitively, the anti-competitive e¤ect of the merger on prices (consumer costs) is larger in
markets where the dynamic parameters are such that the pre-merger equilibrium prices (consumer
costs) are higher.
The main e¤ect of the merger is to generate incentives for the merged rm to increase prices.
Since prices are strategic complements, all the small rms will also increase their prices. As a result
both prices and consumer costs will increase. Because relative prices do change, there will also
be an additional e¤ect on consumer costs due to changes in switching and transportation costs.
This allocation e¤ect on consumer costs is small relative to the e¤ect of prices and the e¤ect of the
merger on consumer costs is essentially the same as the e¤ect on prices. The e¤ect on total costs
is positive but small.
Consider now a case with asymmetric marginal costs. Both the price e¤ect and welfare e¤ect
depend on whether the production cost of the merged products are low or high relative to the rest of
the products in the market. In the static model we found that the price e¤ect of a merger between
less e¢ cient rms is smaller. We also found that a such a merger may be e¢ ciency enhancing
because it provides additional incentives to the merged entity to increase prices. In the dynamic
model, these results also hold but their magnitudes can be di¤erent.
Figure 3 presents results for three di¤erent cases of mergers, which vary in the production cost
of the merged products relative to the production costs of the single-owned products. Specically,
we use three di¤erent values (positive, zero, and negative) for cs cm, the di¤erence between the
average cost of the merged products and the average costs of the other products. For simplicity, we
let ci = cs for all single-product rm i. We plot the range of possible values that consumer costs
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and total costs can take under di¤erent set of dynamic parameter congurations. The dynamic
parameters seem to exacerbate the e¤ects of the cost di¤erences. In markets with high switching
costs, the welfare consequences of a merger depend crucially on the cost di¤erences between the
merged entity and the rest of the rms.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a stylized model of oligopolistic competition that allows for dynamic
demand, product di¤erentiation, and rm asymmetries. A key aspect of the model is that unlike
much of the related literature that focuses on pricing incentives in duopoly, our proposed model
can be applied to any general number of rms. Many of our modeling assumptions are made in
order to lead to a tractable analysis and sharp equilibrium predictions. Indeed, in our central result
(Theorem 1) we show that equilibrium in our model always exists, and that it is unique once we
apply certain equilibrium renements.
We illustrate some of the potential benets of our model by using it to assess the e¤ect of
a merger on pricing and welfare. In particular, we nd that despite the dynamic demand and
the existence of customer relationship, the single most important primitive that a¤ects prices and
welfare is concentration. Yet, we show that once markets are less concentrated, the evaluation of
mergers would benet from further analysis of dynamic aspects of the market, such as the extent of
market growth, as well as rmsand consumersdiscount factors. Just as concentration measures are
broadly used as a quickguide in initial evaluations of proposed merger, we think our framework
may allow other aspects of market dynamics that are relatively easy to observe (churn rate, market
growth rate, etc.) to get incorporated into such preliminary analysis. Of course, this stylized model
cannot substitute for a deeper look into specic markets, and further investigation should look at
much greater details at the specic institutions and practices of particular markets.
We nd that switching costs could make markets either more or less competitive, depending
on other dynamic parameters such as discount rates and market growth rate. Customersmarkets
with patient consumers and inpatient rms are particularly anti competitive. We nd that mergers
increase the average price, consumer costs, and total costs, and that these e¤ects are amplied in
less competitive dynamic environments or when the merger is between two low-cost rms. We also
nd that mergers between high-cost rms may improve total welfare without any cost synergies.
Finally, we observe that if switching costs are high, the e¤ects of the merger become more sensitive
to the cost di¤erences between the merged rm and other rms.
Finally, from a pure applied theory perspective, we view our specic extension of the Hotelling
framework as attractive. In this paper we illustrate its tractability to address issues associated with
dynamic demand. For instance, in our single-product rm model the steady state vector of prices
is perfectly positively correlated with the vector of costs and perfectly negatively correlated with
the vector of market shares. As a result, each of our various welfare measures can be written as a
linear function of the mean and variance of costs, market shares, or prices.
The framework can be extended in various ways, and we think that many of these extensions
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would maintain many of the tractable equilibrium properties. For example, on the demand side, one
can imagine extending the framework to allow for various forms of heterogeneity across consumers,
e.g. in their switching costs, transport costs, discount factors, or the (possibly stochastic) number of
periods they remain in the market. On the supply side, one could allow rms to price discriminate
or to endogenously choose switching costs imposed on consumers. Thus, we hope that further
research would nd ways to utilize our theoretical framework to investigate other important applied
questions.
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Table I
The e¤ect of dynamic parameters (symmetric rms)
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 1.059 0.999 1.000 1.381 1.249 1.250
s -0.108 -0.074 -0.044 0.020 0.280 0.408
g 0.038 -0.004
n_hat -0.073 -0.073
delta_c 0.041 0.041
delta_f -0.166 -0.166
s * g 0.071 0.137 -0.006 -0.086
s * (n_hat) -0.145 -0.067 -0.145 -0.067
s * delta_c 0.092 0.030 0.092 0.030
s * delta_f -0.319 -0.479 -0.319 -0.479
s^2 0.114 0.063 -0.015 -0.145
s * g^2 -0.037 0.001
s * g * (n_hat) -0.023 -0.023
s * g * (delta_c) 0.005 0.005
s * g * (delta_f) 0.096 0.096
s^2 * g -0.043 0.020
s * (n_hat)^2 0.039 0.039
s * (n_hat) * (delta_c) -0.043 -0.043
s * (n_hat) * (delta_f) -0.220 -0.220
s^2 * (n_hat) 0.002 0.002
s * (delta_c)^2 -0.002 -0.002
s * (delta_c) * delta_f 0.006 0.006
s^2 * (delta_c) 0.118 0.118
s * delta_f^2 0.107 0.107
s^2 * delta_f 0.150 0.150
s^3 -0.021 -0.021
R-squared 0.742 0.924 0.991 0.706 0.919 0.989
Number of grid points 100,000 100,000
Baseline equilibrium price Baseline equilibrium consumer costs
We constructed a 100,000 cell-grid where we let n 2 f2; 3; :::; 9; 10; 20; 100g; c; f ; s take 10 equi-spaced values between
0:01 and 0:99; and g takes 10 equi-spaced values between 0:025 and 2:5. We construct n_hat = 1   1=n. In columns (1) and
(4) we report a simple linear projection. The sign of the coe¢ cients are consistent with most of our comparative statics except
for the e¤ect of switching costs on prices; this restricted specication does not allow for a U-shaped e¤ect.
At s = 0, the equilibrium price is equal to L = 1 (regardless of the value of other parameters). We use this information
in columns (2) and (5) to obtain projections in which the primitives all interact with s. We include a quadratic term for s
that allows for a U-shaped e¤ect. Indeed, this improves the t substantially. For a large set of parameters the approximated
price is decreasing for small values of s and increasing for large values of s. The e¤ect on the consumer costs is more likely
to be positive, i.e., the competitive e¤ect of higher switching costs in unlikely to compensate for the increase in the real cost
of switching. The number of rms has a modest e¤ect on both prices and consumer welfare. The coe¢ cient on c reects
that patient young consumers anticipate future prices and are less responsive to current prices, which relaxes competition. The
coe¢ cients on f conrm the intuition that more patient rms have a greater incentive to invest in building a larger customer
base which reduces equilibrium prices and consumer costs. The coe¢ cients on g are consistent with the fact that a larger share
of young consumers in the market relaxes competition because young consumers are less responsive to price changes.
Columns (3) and (6) report regression results from a richer polynomial approximation. While the comparative statics are
not as straightforward, they are still consistent with our previous results. The regression of columns (3) and (6) show that
relatively simple parameterizations can capture the model prediction extremely well, with the R2 getting extremely close to 1.
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Table II
The predicted e¤ect of a merger (Symmetric rms)
Panel A
N constant Pre-mergerprice R-squared
Pre-merger
price range
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3 0.253 1.269 0.989 0.65 - 1.14
4 0.097 1.112 0.998 0.61 - 1.13
5 0.054 1.061 0.999 0.59 - 1.13
6 0.036 1.038 1.000 0.58 - 1.13
7 0.025 1.026 1.000 0.57 - 1.13
8 0.019 1.019 1.000 0.56 - 1.13
9 0.015 1.015 1.000 0.56 - 1.12
10 0.012 1.011 1.000 0.55 - 1.12
11 0.010 1.009 1.000 0.55 - 1.12
12 0.008 1.008 1.000 0.55 - 1.12
Panel B
N constant pre-mergerconsumer cost R-squared
Pre-merger cost
range
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3 0.241 1.220 0.934 1.11 - 1.52
4 0.080 1.099 0.987 1.09 - 1.52
5 0.041 1.057 0.996 1.07 - 1.52
6 0.025 1.037 0.999 1.06 - 1.51
7 0.017 1.026 0.999 1.05 - 1.51
8 0.013 1.020 1.000 1.05 - 1.51
9 0.010 1.015 1.000 1.04 - 1.51
10 0.008 1.012 1.000 1.04 - 1.51
11 0.006 1.010 1.000 1.04 - 1.51
12 0.005 1.008 1.000 1.04 - 1.51
Dependent Variable: Average price post-Merger
Dependent Variable: Consumer cost post-merger
For Panel A, we use the same 100,000 cell-grid as in the regressions reported in Table I to perform a series of simple
regression of pm, the post-merger price on p. We run this regression for each value of N = 3; :::12. Panel B presents the
same regressions for the consumer costs (price paid, transportation and switching costs). The results show that the pre-merger
outcome explains almost all the variation in the post-merger outcome due to di¤erent dynamic parameters. Notice that the
merger e¤ect that is independent of the pre-merger outcome the constant term is column (2) is decreasing in N . Moreover,
the coe¢ cients in column (3) are greater than one and decreasing in N implying that the e¤ect of mergers on prices (consumers
costs) is larger for dynamic parameter congurations for which the pre-merger price (consumerscosts) is high.
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Figure 1
Comparative statics in the baseline model
The gure reports comparative statics of the baseline (symmetric) model. We set the parameter values as indicated at the
bottom right corner of the gure, and then let each parameter vary, holding the rest of the parameters xed. Each graph
presents equilibrium price (solid line, values on the left y-axis) and consumer costs (dashed line, values on the right y-axis).
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Figure 2
The predicted e¤ect of a merger (symmetric rms)
The gure reports the models predictions regarding a merger e¤ect on prices (the e¤ect on consumer costs is very similar).
To generate it, we use a large grid for the values of the model primitives to calculate the e¤ect of the merger on equilibrium
outcomes; the gure reports each vector of parameter values as a point. For a given value of J , the scattered points give rise
to the vertical lines in the gure. Our key interest is the extent of overlap in the e¤ect as we change J . That is, the extent
to which other economic forces may be greater than the market concentration in predicting the price (and welfare) e¤ect of
mergers. The xin each line represents the static case (with s = 0).
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Figure 3
The predicted e¤ect of a merger (asymmetric rms)
The gure plots the range of merger e¤ects on consumer costs (top panel) and total cost (bottom panel) by number of rms.
The top vertical lines in each panel present results for a merger between two low cost rms: cs  cm = 0:5. The middle vertical
lines in each panel present results for a merger between average cost rms cs   cm = 0. The bottom vertical lines in each panel
present results for a merger between high cost rms cs  cm =  0:5. The xin each line represents the static case (with s = 0)
in each case. The welfare e¤ects of mergers depend on the cost di¤erence between the merged entity and the rest of the rms,
especially when switching costs are high.
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APPENDIX
A. Deriving demand from young consumers
In this appendix we derive equation (11) of the paper. Consider the problem of a consumer located on the segment
i$ j at a distance  from i. In the rst period she must decide whether to buy product i or product j. Let  i and
 j be the expected cost of choosing i and j, respectively:
 i =  + pi + cE
 
min

+ p0i; L  + s+ p0j

(45)
 j = L   + pj + cE
 
min

+ s+ p0i; L  + p0j

; (46)
where c is the consumersdiscount factor,  is the location of the consumer in the next period, and p0i (p
0
j) is the
price that rm i (j) will charge in the future. Because there is no uncertainty at the rm level, consumers perfectly
anticipate future prices.
The indi¤erent consumer will be located at , which is dened by
 =
L  pi + pj + cE ( ())
2
; (47)
where  () = min

+ s+ p0i; L  + p0j
   min + p0i; L  + s+ p0j. To compute E ( ()) we condition on
three di¤erent events
E ( ()) = E ( () jA1)P (A1) + E ( () jA2)P (A2) + E ( () jA3)P (A3) ; (48)
where:
A1 =

 2 [0; L] :   1
2
 
L+ p0j   p0i + s

(49)
A2 =

 2 [0; L] :   1
2
 
L+ p0j   p0i   s

(50)
A3 = f 2 [0; L] :  =2 A1 [A2g : (51)
Using the assumption that  is uniformly distributed on [0; L] we obtain that
E ( () jA1) =  s P (A1) = (2L) 1
 
L+ p0i   p0j   s

E ( () jA2) = s P (A2) = (2L) 1
 
L+ p0j   p0i   s

E ( () jA3) = 0 P (A3) = sL
; (52)
and it then follows that
E ( ()) =   s
L
 
p0i   p0j

(53)
and
 =
L  pi + pj   c sL
 
p0i   p0j

2
: (54)
We note that Dyoung;ii$j (pi; pj) = 
gfJ , and we obtain equation (11).
B. The optimal pass-through
In the main text we discuss that transportation and switching costs increase with the variance of prices and that
production costs are decreasing with the covariance of prices and costs. The vector of prices that minimizes the
sum of total costs in steady state is such that the covariance of costs and prices is maximized while at the same
time the variance of prices is minimized. The optimal price vector is aligned with the vector of costs, i.e. for all
i : (pi   p) =  (ci   c). Finding the optimal price vector is equivalent to nding  such that:
min

1
2
 
1 + g (1 + cs)
2 2    1 + g + s+ cgs+ cs2  (55)
It is straightforward to show that:
 =
1 + g + s+ cgs+ cs
2
1 + g (1 + cs)
2 (56)
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The optimal pass-trough coe¢ cient  is decreasing in g. It ranges from one half (when g !1, c = 1, s = 1) to three
(when g ! 0, c = 1, s = 1). This result might be perplexing at rst. It seems that the maximal allocative e¢ ciency
should be achieved by setting  = 1 and making each and every consumer internalize all the economic costs of her
decision. However, that is not correct under our welfare measure. When a young consumer is deciding between two
products, she takes into account the expected costs that that decision will cause her in the future and weights those
costs according to her discount factor c, so future switching costs are weighted by c. The social planner weights
switching costs according to the share of old consumers in the population. This share is 1
1+g
, therefore switching costs
are weighted by a decreasing function of g. Because the social planner and consumers weight expected switching
costs di¤erently, it should not be surprising that the social optimum does not involve  = 1. The intuition that
the optimum is achieved by making the consumers internalize the total economic costs of their actions holds only if
switching costs are 0 or if cg = 1.
In one extreme, suppose that g is close to zero. The share of old consumers in the economy will be close to 1 and
the social planner will only care about minimizing the costs born by old consumers. To minimize switching costs, he
would allocate young consumers to the rm that has higher share in steady state, he can do so by setting prices that
exaggerate the cost di¤erence for young consumers. In the other extreme, suppose that g !1, then in each period
the population is composed mainly of young consumers. The social planner will pay little attention to switching
costs, he would allocate young consumers to the rm with lower current total cost. Forward looking young consumers
react to price di¤erences by a magnitude of 1 + cs, the social planner wants them to react to cost di¤erences by a
magnitude of 1. Therefore, he would set  = (1 + cs)
 1 which is exactly limg!1 .
The allocation that results from  does not achieve the maximum allocative e¢ ciency. The optimal pass-through
 was obtained by choosing the set of prices that minimize costs. However, we restricted prices to be the same across
consumers. A better allocation could be achieved by a price system in which young and old consumers are charged
di¤erent prices.
C. Deriving equation (26)
Substituting equation (25) into equation (24) and replacing M by (J (J   1) fJ=2), we obtain
x0i =
(1  pi + p i)
J
  c s
J (J   1)
 
(J   1) (i    i) + Jx0i   

(57)
or
x0i

J   1 + cs
(J   1)

=
(1  pi + p i)
J
+
cs (   (J   1) (i    i))
J (J   1) = (58)
=
( pi + p i)
J
+
(J   1) + cs (   (J   1) (i    i))
J (J   1) :
This leads to
x0i =
(J   1) (p i   pi   cs (i    i))
J (J   1 + cs) +
1
J
: (59)
Thus,
Dyoungi (pi; p i) = g

J(J   1)
2
fJ

(J   1) (p i   pi   cs (i    i))
J (J   1 + cs) +
1
J

: (60)
D. Proof of Theorem 1
In the main text we derived the demand from young and old consumers. To avoid carrying unnecessary notation
throughout this appendix we make a few normalizations that are without loss of generality. First, we divide both
demands by the market size M = J(J   1)LfJ=2. Since the instantaneous payo¤ is re-scaled, the resulting value
function will also be re-scaled by the same factor. Second, we normalize L = 1 and interpret switching costs s, unit
costs c and prices p in terms of transportation costs, e.g. s = 0:5 means that the switching costs are equivalent to
the transportation costs incurred from travelling from the middle of a segment to one of the rms in the vertices.
Now we investigate the best response of rm i given that competitors and its future incarnations play parallel
strategies: pj = j + xj . The demands given other playersactions are:
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~Dyoungi (pi;; ; x) =
0@ 1
J
+
(J   1)

 i +  1 xiJ 1   pi   cs (i    i)

J ((J   1) + cs)
1A (61)
~Doldi (pi;; ; x) =
1  p i +  i +  1 xiJ 1   s:
J
+ xis: (62)
The value function is:
Vi (xi) = max
pi
0@ (pi   ci)g ~Dyoungi (pi; i;  i; ; x) + ~Doldi (pi;  i; ; x)+
:::+ rfgV

~Dyoungi (pi; i;  i; ; x)
 1A = Ai +Bixi + Cix2i : (63)
The Theorem assumes that 0 < c; s < 1, J > 2, g > 0 and 0 < f = rfg < 1. The last assumption ensures
discounting. A symmetric MPE will be J tuples (i; Ai; Bi) and a pair (;C) such that: Vi (xi) = Ai +Bixi +Cx2i
satises the functional equation for every rm when each rm j follows the linear policy function j + xj ; and that
such policy is a best response when all other rms also play that policy.
The method of undetermined coe¢ cients will leave us with a system of 3J + 2 non-linear equations and 3J + 2
unknowns that might have several solutions. The purpose of this appendix is to show that there is one and only one
of those solutions that can constitute an equilibrium. There is an additional qualication that our solution has to
satisfy to be an equilibrium. We have to show that the second order conditions hold and that there are no protable
non-local deviations. We are able to prove that the second order condition holds and that in equilibrium each rm
faces a concave maximization problem if rms are not allowed to exit a particular segment. A rm exits a segment
if it sets a price so high that no young consumers will buy from it in that period. We can rationalize this behavior
as in Beggs and Klemperer (1992) by assuming that rms have to pay a su¢ ciently high exit cost if they decide to
exit a segment. It is only for cases with large switching costs that this additional assumption is necessary.
Let us rst sketch the next steps, which are detailed below. First, we note that the dynamics implied by any
equilibrium policy function (i; ) has to satisfy a non-divergence condition that will bound the possible values of .
Second, we show that for each value of  there is only one value of C that satises the functional equation, we denote
such function as C1 (), more importantly, we show that the solution for C does not depend on any  or c. Third,
we show that plugging the resulting C1 () in the functional equation yields a concave problem for the rm for every
. Fourth, we dene a function 0 = f () that returns a best response 0 for every  employed by other rms and
future incarnations of the same rm, we also show that f () does not depend on any  or c. Fifth, we show that
this function is continuous and that it has at least one xed point in the relevant interval of . Sixth, we show that
there is a unique xed point in the interval. Seventh, we show how the other coe¢ cients (i; Ai; Bi) are uniquely
determined for each rm once  and C are known.
1. Lower and upper bounds for . Since our space state is bounded, a set of linear policies that generates divergent
dynamics cannot be an MPE. If all rms employ the policy function i + xi, then equation (61) implies that:
x0i =
J   1 +  (1 + cs) + (J   1) ((1 + cs) ( i   i))
J (J   1 + cs)  

(J   1 + cs)xi: (64)
Therefore, the dynamics will be non-divergent if and only if  2 ;  where  =   (J   1) = (1  cs) and  =
(J   1) = (1 + cs).
2. Dene the function C1 () :Substituting pi = i + xi in equation (61) and evaluating equation (63) results in
a quadratic function of the state xi. The quadratic coe¢ cient will be linear in C. Equating the quadratic coe¢ cient
to C and solving for C yields the following function:
C1 () =
 (J   1 + cs) ((J   1)2 s+ (J   1) (1 + gcs2)   cs2)
(J   1)  (J   1 + cs)2   f2 : (65)
Notice that this function depends on  and parameters of the model but it does not depend on any ;A;B or c. This
function is continuous for all  2 ;  since the denominator is always positive in that interval. The numerator has
two roots lesser than , one root at 0 and one root in the interval

0; 

. Therefore, C1 () is negative for  2

; 0

;
C1 (0) = 0; C1 () > 0 for  2 (0; k) and C1 () < 0 for  2
 
k; 

.
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3. Third Step: Show that the maximand is concave for all (C; ) such that C = C1 () and  2

; 

. For any
bounded value function, the maximand in equation (63) is concave if:
2
 
g
@ ~D0youngi (pi;; ; x)
@pi
 
1 + fC
@ ~D0youngi (pi;; ; x)
@pi
!
+
@ ~Doldi (pi;; ; x)
@pi
!
< 0: (66)
After replacing C by C1 () this expression depends only on  and on the parameters J; f ; c; g and s. We show that
for all permissible parameter values and for all  2 ; , the second derivative of the maximand is concave. The
denominator of the expression above is positive and the numerator is a cubic function of . It can be shown that the
intercept of the cubic function is negative and its real roots are all outside the interval  2 ; . Therefore, the
maximand is concave in the whole interval (the algebraic details are available upon request).
4. Dene a function 0 = f () that returns a best response 0 for every  employed by other rms and future
incarnations of the same rm. Given that the maximand is concave we can use the rst order conditions to derive
the best response from a given rm. Since demands are linear in pi and xi, the maximand will be a quadratic
form in (pi; xi). Ai; Bi and i do not appear in the terms where pi and xi interact. We obtain the best response
pi () =  () +  ()xi. While  () depends on the original Ai; Bi; C; i; ,  () depends only on  and C.
Replacing C by C1 (), we obtain 0 = f () =  (;C1 ()).
5. f () is continuous and has at least one xed point in the relevant interval of . The function f () = Q()
P ()
is a ratio of a quartic polynomial Q () over a cubic polynomial P (). f () is discontinuous at the roots of its
denominator. We show that the denominator, P (), is positive for all  2 ;  and that its roots are outside the
interval. Let F () = f ()    = Q() P ()
P ()
. A root of the quartic polynomial R () = Q ()   P () will be an
equilibrium if it is located in the relevant range

; 

. We show that there is a root of this polynomial in the interval
0; 

by showing that R(0) > 0 and R() < 0.
6. Uniqueness. Uniqueness is established by showing that R () has only one root in the interval

; 

. Let
R () = 0 + 1 + 2
2 + 3
3 + 4
4, where the ks are a function of the parameters of the model. First, we
notice that R (a) < 0, R
 


> 0, R(0) > 0 and R() < 0 where a =   (J   1) = (cs) <  < 0 < . One root is in
the interval
 
a; 

and another one in the interval
 
0; 

. The proof consists in showing that the other two roots are
outside the interval
 
; 

.
The term 4 governs the behavior of R as  goes to minus or plus innity:
4 = Jcs (f   cs (2J   1)) : (67)
If 4 > 0 then there can be only one root in

; 

. This is because the four roots rk, k = 1; 2; 3; 4 are such that
r1 < a, a < r2 < , 0 < r3 <  and  < r4.
If 4 = 0, then R() is a cubic function with roots in r1 < a, a < r2 <  and 0 < r3 <  (if 3 < 0), or in
a < r1 < , 0 < r2 <  and  < r3 (if 3 < 0). If the function is quadratic, 4 = 3 = 0, it has two roots: a < r1 < ,
0 < r2 < .
If 4 < 0, we know the location of only two real roots of the polynomial. If the other two roots are complex, then
our results follows automatically; therefore, we focus in cases where the four roots are real. First, we show that there
are no roots in the interval

; 0

. For all  2 ; 0, C1 () < 0 and for all  2 ; 0 and C < 0,  (;C) > 0,
therefore f () does not have a xed point in that interval.
Now, we have to show that for 4 < 0, R () has only one root in

0; 

. Using Vietas formulas, we can deduce
the location of the other roots once we know the sign of 1; 2 and 3. Since 4 < 0 and 0 > 0, the polynomial
has either one or three positive roots. For the cases in the left column there is only one positive root and our result
holds. For the four cases in the right column, we need to show that the additional two positive roots lie outside the
range

0; 

.
(1; 2; 3) (1; 2; 3)
( ; ; ) ( ; ;+)
(+; ; ) ( ;+;+)
(+;+; ) ( ;+; )
(+;+;+) (+; ;+)
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We show that if 1 > 0 then 3 < 0, which rules out the case (+; ;+). Then, we focus on the cases ( ; ;+)
and ( ;+;+). Notice that at  = 0, the rst derivative is negative (i.e. R0() < 0). We show that this derivative is
negative for all  2 0; . To show that, we dene the function:
T1 () = 1 + 22 + 33
2: (68)
Since 4 < 0, T1 () > R
0 () for all  > 0. Besides, 3 > 0 and 1 < 0 imply that T1 () has one positive root
and one negative root. We show that T1
 


< 0 (i.e. the positive root of T1 () is greater than ); therefore:
0 > T1 () > R
0 () for all  2 0;  and our result follows.
Finally, for the case ( ;+; ) we also prove that R0() < 0 for all  2 0; . We dene
T2 () = 1 + 22: (69)
Since 4; 3 < 0, T2 () > R
0 () for all  > 0. T2 () is a linear function with negative intercept and positive slope.
We show that T2
 


< 0; therefore, 0 > T2 () > R0 () for all  2

0; 

and our result follows. We have shown that
there is a unique  2 ;  that satises the functional equation. Since any  2 ;  implies convergent dynamics,
any symmetric MPE in parallel strategies has to satisfy  = .
7. The other coe¢ cients are uniquely determined once  is known. Once  and C = C1 () are determined,
the equations for fBi; ig form a two-by-two linear system with non-zero determinant. We solve for the unique
fB; g that solves the system. The equation for Ai is a linear equation with one unknown that can be easily solved
for once fBi ; C; i ; g are determined. After nding  and C, we calculate i and Bi for each rm i. The best
response intercept i is a linear function of the average  i and the own marginal cost ci. More specically, i is
given by
i = 0 + 1 i + (1  1) ci; (70)
where 0 > 0 and 0 < 1 < 1 depend only on the dynamic parameters of the model and on the equilibrium
values of the pair (;C). Therefore, in equilibrium these coe¢ cients are the same across rms. Taking the
J equations described by equation (70) and solving for i yields the equilibrium intercept i:
i =
0
1  1
+

J   1 + (2  J) 1
J   1 + 1
ci +
(J   1) 1
J   1 + 1
c i

: (71)
= c+
0
1  1
+
(J   1) (1  1)
J   1 + 1
(ci   c) (72)
Let 0 =
0
1 1 > 0, 1 =
(J 1)(1 1)
J 1+1 2 (0; 1). Notice that in the static case (when s = 0), 0 = 1 = 0:5,
0 = 1 and 1 =
(J 1)
2J 1 .
E. Discussion and derivations of various extensions to the model
In this appendix we provide details about the general model that allows for asymmetric marginal costs and product
ownership. We show that the model allows for a linear policy function and a quadratic value function.
We assume that there are J products owned by K rms. If rm k owns product i we say that k = K (i). As in
the symmetric case, consumers are spread (uniformly) along the J(J  1)=2 segments of the (J  1) simplex, with the
products located at the vertices. We allow each of the J (J   1) =2 segments to have a di¤erent density, denoted by
fi$j , but we still require their length to be equal to a constant L = 1. If rm k owns products i and j we say that
segment i$ j is trapped by k. The segments that are not trapped by any rm are called competitive. We allow for
a rm-specic marginal cost, ck.
Demand. Demand for rm k can come from four sources. The rst three sources are the same as in the baseline
model, i.e. three types of consumers located in the competitive segments: existing (old) consumers of own products,
existing (old) consumers of competing products and new (young) consumers. The fourth source is demand from
young and old consumers located in segments trapped by the rm k.
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Deriving demands from old consumers in competitive segments is straightforward. Demand on segment i $ j
from existing (old) consumers of product i and existing (old) consumers of product j is given, respectively, by
Dold;ii$j (pK(i); pK(j)) =
1
2
 
1  pK(i) + pK(j) + s

fi$j (73)
Dold;ji$j (pK(i); pK(j)) =
1
2
 
1  pK(i) + pK(j)   s

fi$j : (74)
Let xi$j denote product is market share among old consumers on segment i $ j, so aggregate demand for rm
k = K (i) from old consumers in competitive segments is given by:
Doldk (pk; p k; xk) =
X
i:K(i)=k
X
j:K(j) 6=k
xi$jD
old;i
i$j (pi; pj) + (1  xi$j)Dold;ji$j (pi; pj) (75)
=
X
i:K(i)=k
X
j:K(j) 6=k
fi$j
2
 
1  pk + pK(j)   s+ 2xi$js

= fk

1  pk   s
2

+
X
m6=k
fm$kpm
2
+ sfxk
where fk =
P
i:K(i)=k
P
j:K(j) 6=k fi$j , fm$k =
P
i:K(i)=k
P
j:K(j)=k fi$j and f =
PK
k=1
fk
2
. Notice that fk, fm$k
and f denote the mass of consumers located, respectively, in competitive segments in which k is one of the competing
rm, in segments disputed bym and k, and in all competitive segments. Finally, xk = f 1
P
i:K(i)=k
P
j:K(j) 6=k fi$jxi$j
is rm ks market share among consumers in competitive segments. An important observation is that the demand
from old consumers depends only on pk, xk and some weighted average of competitorsprices. Moreover, it is linear
in these three variables.
We showed before that the demand from young customers in a competitive segment i$ j is given by:
Dyoung;ii$j (pK(i); pK(j)) =
1
2
 
1  pK(i) + pK(j)   cs
 
p0K(i)()  p0K(j)()

gfi$j (76)
which aggregates to
Dyoungk (pk; p k) = g
X
i:K(i)=k
X
j:K(j) 6=k
1
2
 
1  pk + pK(j)   cs
 
p0k()  p0K(j)()

fi$j (77)
= g
0@fk 1
2
(1  pk) +
X
m6=k
fm$kpm
2
  cs
2
0@fkp0k() X
m6=k
fm$kp
0
m()
1A1A :
As before, c is the rate at which consumers discount second period utility and p0k() and p0m() are the equilibrium
prices consumers believe to face in the subsequent period.
Equilibrium. We solve for an MPE where rmsstrategies are a linear function of the vector of market shares
among old consumers. Once rms believe that opponents have such linear strategies and that young consumers
beliefs about future prices conform with these strategies, rms optimal behavior would be, indeed, linear in the
vector of market shares. Thus, we assume that rmsequilibrium strategies follow this linear form pk = p0kx where
pk;x 2 RK and 10x =1 (1 is an m-dimensional vector of ones). Since the state x is in the unit simplex we have
that for any scalar a and b 2 RK : a + b0x =(a1+ b)0 x. Therefore, our denition of a linear policy function can
accommodate an intercept.
We are going to derive rm k best response given that of all other rms and future incarnations of all rms play
a linear strategy. Substituting pm = p0mx in equation (75) yields:
Doldk (pk;p k;x) = fk

1  pk   s
2

+
X
m6=k
fm$kp0mx
2
+ sfxk (78)
=
0@fk 1  s
2

1+
X
m6=k
fm$kpm
2
1A0 x  fk
2

pk + (sf)xk
= doldk;xx  doldk;ppk
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where doldk;x 2RK is a row vector and doldk;p is a scalar. The demand from young consumers in equation (77) becomes:
Dyoungk (pk;p k;x;x+1) = g
0@fk
2
(1  pk) +
X
m6=k
fm$kpm
2
  cs
2
0@fkp0k() X
m6=k
fm$kp
0
m()
1A1A (79)
= g
0@fk
2
(1  pk) +
X
m6=k
fm$kp0mx
2
  cs
2
0@fkpk  X
m6=k
fm$kpm
1A0 x+1
1A (80)
= g
0@fk
2
1+
X
m6=k
fm$kpm
2
1A0 x  g fk
2
pk   g cs
2
0@fkpk  X
m6=k
fm$kpm
1A0 x+1
where x+1 is next periods state. Because the entire vector x+1 enters the value function, we also need to derive the
e¤ect of pk on the whole vector of market shares. In particular for m 6= k:
Dyoungm (pk;p k;x;x+1) = g
0@fm
2
1  fm
2
pm +
X
h6=m;k
fm$hph
2
1A0 x+g fk$m
2
pk g cs
2
0@fmpm   X
h6=m
fm$hph
1A0 x+1:
(81)
Let y =

Dyoungm (pm;p m;x;x+1)
	K
m=1
be the vector of demand from young consumers. Notice that x+1 =
y (gfL) 1 and that we can write:
y = Dyoungk;x x+D
young
k;x+1
x+1 + d
young
k;p pk (82)
= Dyoungk;x x+D
young
k;x+1
y (gfL) 1 + dyoungk;p pk
=

I Dyoungk;x+1 (gfL)
 1
 1  
Dyoungk;x x+ d
young
k;p pk

where Dyoungk;x+1 ;D
young
k;x are K-by-K matrices and d
young
k;p 2RK is a row vector. The kth element of y is yk = dyoungk;x x 
dyoungk;p pk.
We have shown that demand from young and old consumers can be expressed as a linear functional of the current
state, x, and rm k price, pk. Given this demand from young consumers and demand from old consumers, each rm
solves the following problem:
Vk (x) = max
pk
0B@ (pk   ck)

(1 + g) fk$k +

dyoungk;x + d
old
k;x

x 

dyoungk;p + d
old
k;p

pk

+fVk

(gfL) I Dyoungk;x+1
 1 
Dyoungk;x x+ d
young
k;p pk

1CA ; (83)
where ck is the rm specic unit cost and fk$k =
P
i:K(i)=k
P
j:K(j)=k
fi$j
2
is such that fk$k is the mass of consumers
in segments trapped by k.
We show that the value function that satises this functional equation is a quadratic form: Vk (x) = x0Vkx.
Since the state x is in the unit simplex we have that for any scalar a, b 2 RK and any K-by-K matrix C: a +
b0x+ x0Cx = x0 (a110+0:5b10 + 0:51b0 +C)x.
Let:
dk;x = d
young
k;x + d
old
k;x + (1 + g) fk$k (84)
dk;p = d
young
k;p + d
old
k;p (85)
Zk;x =

(gfL) I Dyoungk;x+1
 1
Dyoungk;x x (86)
zk;p =

(gfL) I Dyoungk;x+1
 1
dyoungk;p pk (87)
then
Vk (x) = max
p
 
(pk   ck) (dk;xx dk;ppk) + f (Zx+ zpk)0Vk (Zx+ zpk)

(88)
= max
p
  
fz
0Vkz  dk;p

p2k +
  
2fz
0VkZ+ dk;x

x ckdk;p

pk   ckdk;xx+fx0Z0VkZx

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If this function is concave, the optimal price is linear and given by:
pk =   ((2fz
0VkZ+ dk;x)x ckdk;p)
2 (fz0Vkz  dk;p) = ~p
0
kx (89)
which yields a quadratic value function:
Vk (x) = x
0~pk
 
fz
0Vkz  dk;p

~p0kx+ x
0~pk
 
2fz
0VkZ+ dk;x

x+ (90)
+fx
0Z0VkZx ck
 
(dk;p~p
0
k + dk;x)x

= x0 ~Vkx
Then, if there are no non-local deviations: (i) the relevant state space is the K   1 dimensional unit simplex:
X =

x 2RK : 0  xk  1;
P
xk = 1
	
; (ii) the best response to linear policy functions,p0kx, is a linear policy function:
~p0kx; and (iii) the resulting value function is a quadratic form: x
0Vx.
The best response of a linear policy function will be linear if there are no protable non-local deviations. In
particular, rms might decide to give up in one market and exploit the locked in consumers, specially consumers in
trapped segments. One way to avoid this type of deviation is to bound consumer values. Our assumption of covered
markets is based on a more primitive assumptions of su¢ ciently high consumer values. Now, we have to assume that
values are high enough for markets to be fully covered but low enough such that the rm does not nd it protable
to forgo all other markets in order to milk trapped consumers. The maximum consumer valuation that prevents this
deviation can be easily derived once we obtained the equilibrium policies. A second way to avoid these deviations is
to assume that rms have to pay a su¢ ciently high exit cost if they decide to exit a segment.
Computation of the equilibrium. So far we do not have existence or uniqueness results for the asymmetric case.
However, we expect that the results in the symmetric case translate into similar results for the asymmetric case. We
are able to solve numerically for an equilibrium in the asymmetric case. To do that we proceed as follows:
1. Classify the K rms into J types such that rms within each type are symmetric.
2. Set initially p0k= 0.
3. Obtain the best response for each type of rm ~p0j :
4. Set p0k = p0J(k) and repeat steps 3-4 until policies converge.
5. Check that the solution implies convergent dynamics and satises second order conditions.
6. Obtain the maximum consumer values such that no rm is willing to milk captured consumers.
Specialization to the case of a symmetric model with a merger. We focus on the specic case of a merger occurring
in a symmetric market. The initial market structure has N = J symmetric single-product rms, while the post-
merger structure has J   2 such rms and a single merged entity that owns two products. If k = N is the merged
entity, fN$N = fk$l = fJ and fN$k = 2fJ for any k; l 6= N . Moreover, fN = (J   2) 2fJ , fk = (J   1) fJ and
f = (J   2) (J + 1) fJ=2. By symmetry of the J 2 rm we can assume that the merged rm reacts symmetrically to
the other J   2 rms. Therefore, its policy function will depend only on its own share. However, the policy function
of each of the J   2 small rms will depend not only on their own share but also on the merged rm share.
Once we solved numerically for the equilibrium policies and prices we can compute steady state welfare and
prots.
Steady State Equilibrium: we derive the mean and variance of prices in the steady state equilibrium to inform the
welfare analysis. To calculate the e¤ect of total costs we also need the steady state covariance between prices and
costs.
We have shown that the general multi-product rm model has a linear-quadratic structure which results in linear
policy functions. A parallel equilibrium may not exist because the demand structure is asymmetric. The merged
entity is going to be a larger rm; therefore, its price is going to have a larger e¤ect on the residual demand curve
of its competitors. In equilibrium, the merged entity price according to its share; therefore, competitors are going to
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condition their prices on their own shares and on the merged entity share. If we introduce more asymmetries on the
demand side, we should expect more complex equilibrium pricing behavior.
In the general multi-product rms case, the equilibrium is characterized by two J-by-J matrices B and E such
that the equilibrium prices are given by
p = Bx+ Ec (91)
where p denotes the price vector, x is the vector of market shares and c is the vector of costs. Notice that in the case
of a merger between rms j and k, if we additionally impose that the merged entity has to charge the same price for
the two products it owns, then the jth and kth rows of B are going to be the identical. Similarly, the jth and kth
rows of E are going to be the identical too.
As seen in equation (13), for a steady state vector of prices , the market share among young consumers is
x =    X
J   1Mp (92)
where M is such that y   y = My and  is a vector of 1=J . Plugging (92) in (91) and solving for p we obtain the
unique equilibrium price vector p that is consistent with a steady state equilibrium:
p = QB +QEc, (93)
where Q =

I + X
J 1BM
 1
.
The mean price is:
p = 0p = 0QB + 0QEc (94)
The rst term will be analogous to pss0, i.e.pmss0 = 
0QB is the average price when costs are zero. The second term
is the inner product of a set of weights ! = 0QE with the vector of costs. Therefore, in the merger case, the mean
price can be written as:14
p = pmss0 + c+ 2

1
J
  !m

(cs   cm) (95)
!m is a scalar: the weight of one of the merged rms in !. c,cm,cs are mean costs, mean cost among the merged
rms and mean cost among non-merging rms, respectively.
The covariance between costs and prices is (J   1) 1 c0Mp, where:
c0Mp = c0MQB + c0MQEc: (96)
The rst term is another set of weights, and the second term is a quadratic form in costs. H =MQE is a symmetric
matrix that can be decomposed in its eigenvalues. In the merger case we analyze in the paper, 1 is an eigenvalue
associated to a one-dimensional eigenspace, 2 is an eigenvalue of H associated to a J   3 dimensional eigenspace,
and the remaining two eigenvalues of H are zero.15
pc = (J   1) 1 c0Mp =   2m
(J   1) (cs   cm) 
2 (J   2)
J (J   1) (2   1) (cs   cm)
2 + 2
2
c ; (97)
where The coe¢ cient m is the weight of one of the merged rms in =MQB.
Finally, the variance of prices given by
p0Mp = 0B0Q0MQB + 20B0Q0MQEc+ c0E0Q0MQEc = 0+ 20Hc+ c0HHc: (98)
The rst term captures the variance in prices due to the fact that one rm owns more than one product. The second
and third terms are linear and quadratic forms of c, respectively. In the merger case under consideration,
2p = (J   1) 1 p0Mp = 2J
2
m
(J   2) (J   1)  
4m1
(J   1) (cs   cm) 
2 (J   2)
J (J   1)
 
22   21

(cs   cm)2 + 222c ; (99)
where m, 1 and 2 were dened above.
In the single product rm market the formula above reduces to (e)2 (ci   c)0 (ci   c). The e¤ect of a merger
can be seen comparing the formula above with the variance decomposition formula for (ci   c)0 (ci   c), i.e. the
variance will remain una¤ected if 21 = 
2
2 = (
e)2 and if the merging rms have the same costs. After the merger, 21
14 In the single product case: 0QB = pss0 and 0QE = 0.
15 In the single product case, the rst term is zero since MQB = 0. The second term is c0Hc, where H has J   1 non-zero
identical eigenvalues equal to e (as dened above) so that: c0Hc =e
PJ
j=1 (ci   c)2
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captures the contribution of mean cost di¤erences between the merged entity and the small rms, while 2 captures
the contribution of cost asymmetries among the small rms to the overall price dispersion.
The equilibrium outcomes that determine the mean and variance of the steady state prices and the correlation
with costs are: pmss0, the average price when costs are zero; !m the weight associated with the one of the merged
rms in the weighted average of costs that determine the mean price16 ; m, the strength of the covariance between
cost and price due to the merger; bias e¤ect in the covariance with costs; 1 the e¤ect of intergroup cost variance
between the merged rms and the other rms; and 2 the e¤ect of cost variance among small rms.
Summary of outcomes:
Outcome Pre-Merger, s = 0 Pre-Merger, s 6= 0 Merger, s = 0 Merger, s 6= 0
pmss0 1 pss0 1 +
2J 1
(J 2)J2 [p
m
ss0] > pss0
!m 1=J 1=J
2J 1
2J2
1
J+1
< [!m] <
2J 1
2J2
m 0 0
J 1
2J2
0 < [m] <
J 1
2J2
1
J 1
2J 1 1 = 2 <
J 1
2J 1
J 1
2J
[1] < 2; [1] <
J 1
2J
2
J 1
2J 1 1 = 2 <
J 1
2J 1
J 1
2J 1 [2] < 
e < J 1
2J 1
The e¤ect of a merger: Recall the e¤ect on the mean price:
4p = pm   p = (pmss0   pss0) + 2

1
J
  !m

(cs   cm) (100)
and the e¤ect on the covariance between prices and costs:
4cp(J   1) = c0Mpm   c0Mp (101)
=  2m (cs   cm) 
2 (J   2)
J
(2   1) (cs   cm)2 + (2   e) (J   1)2c
The e¤ect on the price variance:
42(J   1) = p0Mpm   p0Mp (102)
=
2J2m
(J   2)   4m1 (cs   cm) 
2 (J   2)
J
 
22   21

(cs   cm)2 +

22   (e)2

(J   1)2c
E¤ect on consumer average costs:
4p  1 + g
 
1  2cs2

+ 2s (1 + cs)
2 (1 + g)
42 (103)
E¤ect on total average costs:
1 + g (1 + cs)
2
2 (1 + g)
42p  
 
1 + g + s+ cgs+ cs
2

(1 + g)
4cp (104)
Not all the values of 2 and (cm   cs) are consistent with the proposed equilibrium in linear strategies. We know
that if 2 = 0 the proposed equilibrium in linear strategies will satisfy the requirement that the marginal consumer
in each segment is located strictly in the interior of the segment and that rms make non-negative prots. These
requirements may be violated for large 2 and jcm   csj. To see why, notice that if there is too much variation in
costs, it will generate too much variation in prescribed equilibrium prices, but that may imply that for some edge
one rm captures the whole market (among one of the three set of consumers: young, and two set of old consumers
according to their a¢ liation).
Other possible extensions:
1. Consumers live for a xed number T > 2 of periods: The state space grows since now rms will condition
their pricing strategy on their market share in each cohort. Moreover, it is necessary to derive the demand of
consumers in each of the t < T periods. The demand of consumers in their last period remains unchanged.
16 If !1 = 1J , each product is weighed equally. If !1 =
1
2(J 1) each entity receives an equal weight irrespective of how many
products it owns.
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2. Consumers exit the market stochastically at rate : It is necessary to adjust the demand from the young and old
consumers to accordingly. The only di¤erence between the two types of consumers is that young consumers are
not attached to any good. However, both young and old consumers will take into account the future behavior
of rms since with some probability they will be a¤ected by it.
F. Deriving equilibrium prices in the static model with multi-product rms.
We analyze the case of N = J   1 rms where rms 1 to N   1 each own product 1 to J   2, respectively, and rm
N owns both products J   1 and product J . For i  N   1, the single product rm maximizes
1
2
(J   1)fJ (1 + p i   pi) (pi   ci) (105)
where p i is the average competitorsprice in each of the segments where rm i competes (i.e., the multi-product
rm appears twice). Notice that if the rm sets pi = p i, it will sell to half of the consumers that are located in
segments where rm i competes. The best response to p i is:
pi =
1 + p i + ci
2
: (106)
Notice that
p i =
Jp  pi
J   1 ; (107)
where p is the average price across products (the price of the multi-product rm enters twice). Therefore, the best
response can be written as
pi =
(J   1)
2J   1 +
Jp
2J   1  
(J   1)ci
2J   1 : (108)
Let ps be the average price among the single product rms and let cs be their average cost. Then
ps =
(J   1)
2J   1 +
Jp
2J   1 +
(J   1)cs
2J   1 : (109)
Firm N will then maximize
fJ (L+ (J   2) (1 + p N   pN )) (pN   cm) ; (110)
where cm is the average cost of the multi-product rm and p N is the average competitorsprice. The best response
is
pN =
J   1
2(J   2) +
cm
2
+
p N
2
(111)
Notice that
p N =
Jp  2pN
J   2 ; (112)
and the best response can be written as
pN =
1
2
+
Jp
2(J   1) +
(J   2)cm
2(J   1) : (113)
The average price equals
p =
2pN + (J   2)ps
J
. (114)
We use equations (108), (109), and (113) to solve for the equilibrium prices:
pmN =
(J   1)(2J   1)
2(J   2)J +
(J + 1)cm
2J
+
(J   1)cs
2J
(115)
and
psi =
(J   1)2
(J   2)J +
cs(J   1)2
J(2J   1) +
ci(J   1)
2J   1 +
cm
J
: (116)
Equations (37) and (38) in the paper follow directly from these expressions.
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